Friday, 1 November 2024

Paper Companies

In India, the term "paper company" or "shell company" is often used to describe entities that exist primarily on paper, with little or no actual business activity. But if we step back, it’s clear that all companies, by their nature, are paper entities—legal constructs rather than physical beings. A company is an artificial entity, created through documentation and compliance procedures, defined by the paperwork that establishes and governs it. It is the legal paper that makes a company a company; they are not people, and they don’t exist outside the constructs of law and compliance.

The distinction, therefore, is not between real companies and paper companies but between those that serve a lawful, intended purpose and those that might be structured to obscure dubious activities. Many paper-based entities operate legitimately, while others may misuse the legal framework.

Legitimate Roles of Low-Activity or Dormant Companies

Several business structures operate with minimal visible activity but serve valid and strategic purposes:

  • Holding Companies: Holding companies are legitimate entities set up to manage and control shares in other companies. They typically exist to organize assets, streamline operations, and facilitate business strategy but may not engage in daily business transactions.

  • Asset-Specific Companies: Some companies are established specifically to hold a single asset, such as intellectual property or real estate, and have no operational need for employees or frequent transactions.

  • Dormant Companies: Businesses may register and maintain companies with future prospects in mind. Dormant companies, or early-stage startups, might be inactive yet compliant, waiting to launch or re-purpose based on business needs.

These companies exist to fulfill legal and strategic purposes, even if their day-to-day activities are minimal or absent. Simply put, they are "paper companies" in the sense that they are entities governed by documentation and legal requirements, but they are not illegitimate.

Regulatory Oversight and the Broad Approach

Despite the inherent legitimacy of paper entities, regulatory bodies like the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), and the Income Tax Department have intensified scrutiny on companies with minimal operations, concerned that they may be conduits for tax evasion, money laundering, or other illicit activities. However, their approach often categorizes all inactive or minimally active companies together, leading to a broad sweep that includes legitimate entities within its scope.

When Overreach Affects Compliance

A key example of such overreach was seen in 2017, when the MCA deregistered over 200,000 companies due to inactivity. While the intent was to target suspicious entities, many compliant holding companies, dormant businesses, and investment vehicles were also affected. This broad-brush approach does not account for the varied, legitimate reasons a company might remain inactive or minimal in operations, even while fully compliant with tax filings, MCA requirements, and other obligations.

The Distinction Between Inactive and Illegitimate

In India’s regulatory environment, the lack of a legal definition for "shell company" or "paper company" has led to misinterpretations. Inactive does not mean illegitimate, and minimal operations do not equate to suspicious intent. Key reasons why inactive or paper-based companies are legitimate include:

  1. Strategic Legal Structuring: Many entities, such as holding companies or asset-specific entities, play crucial roles in corporate strategy without the need for day-to-day transactions.

  2. Compliance-Driven Purpose: Companies that file taxes, submit MCA documentation, and meet regulatory requirements operate within the law, regardless of their operational size.

  3. Future-Ready Ventures: Companies may maintain dormant status for future purposes, such as expansions, investments, or future reactivation, without engaging in substantial activities immediately.

The Need for a Targeted Approach

Regulatory efforts would benefit from focusing on specific patterns of non-compliance or suspicious transactions instead of generalizing based on minimal activity. Distinguishing between companies with complex business structures and companies involved in illicit transactions would allow authorities to better target actual misuse.

By refining their approach, regulatory bodies could more effectively identify companies involved in suspicious activities, without unduly penalizing those that serve lawful, strategic purposes. This would protect the interests of law-abiding businesses, support economic strategy, and help prevent the unnecessary burdens that blanket measures create.

Conclusion

In essence, every company is a paper entity—formed and governed by legal documentation. Yet, the function and purpose of these entities vary widely, from active trading companies to passive holding structures. While regulatory oversight is essential to curb misuse, a more discerning, criteria-based approach is needed to differentiate between companies with minimal activity for legitimate reasons and those structured for dubious purposes. This would foster a balanced, fair regulatory environment that supports lawful business operations while focusing resources on genuine cases of misuse.

Summons under PMLA

The Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) allows statements recorded by investigating officers to be used as evidence in court under Section 50. This provision undermines key constitutional rights and opens the door for abuse, similar to what occurred under TADA and POTA.


1. Violation of Constitutional Rights
Self-Incrimination (Article 20(3)): PMLA violates the right against self-incrimination by making statements recorded by officers admissible, creating pressure for individuals to incriminate themselves. In Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978), the Supreme Court held that indirect coercion to confess violates Article 20(3).
Right to Fair Procedure (Article 21): Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) established that the procedure must be "fair, just, and reasonable." PMLA's lack of safeguards compromises fair trial rights by allowing statements made without judicial oversight to be used as evidence.

2. Historical Abuse Under TADA and POTA
Similar provisions under TADA and POTA allowed statements made before officers to be admissible, leading to widespread misuse. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) recognized the potential for abuse under TADA. Both TADA and POTA were repealed due to their coercive nature and misuse for extracting false confessions.

3. Artificial Distinction Between ED and Police Officers
PMLA's classification of ED officers as "non-police" allows them to record admissible statements. However, this distinction is arbitrary, as ED officers perform police-like functions. In Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu (2020), the Supreme Court ruled that officers under similar laws (NDPS) should be considered police officers, making confessions inadmissible. The same logic should apply to ED officers under PMLA.

4. Lack of Safeguards and Judicial Oversight
Unlike confessions made before a magistrate, PMLA provides no neutral oversight during questioning. This lack of protection increases the risk of coercion and violates principles outlined in Section 164 of the CrPC, which requires that confessions be made voluntarily before a judicial officer.

5. Global Standards and Potential for Misuse
International law, such as in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) in the U.S., protects individuals from coercive interrogations. PMLA falls short of such standards. Moreover, the act has been used for selective targeting, raising concerns about political misuse, much like the misuse of TADA and POTA.

Conclusion
PMLA’s provisions allowing statements made to investigating officers to be used as evidence violate constitutional safeguards, lack proper oversight, and mirror the abuses seen under TADA and POTA. Either these provisions should be repealed, or significant reforms are needed to ensure fair legal processes.

Sunday, 22 September 2024

Guidelines for Committee of Creditors

In their infinite wisdom, the guardians of insolvency have issued “Guidelines” for the Committee of Creditors (CoC) on 06.08.2024. A quick read of the 3-page document reveals that the IBBI expects the CoC to demonstrate: (i) objectivity and integrity, (ii) independence and impartiality, (iii) professional competence and participation, (iv) cooperation, supervision, and timeliness, (v) confidentiality, and (vi) the sharing of information. Essentially, the IBBI has tossed around a bunch of action verbs reminiscent of the jargon MBA graduates throw around during vague consulting interviews.

 

This contrasts with the numerous other guidelines, circulars, notifications, and amendments to regulations that the IBBI periodically issues, often leaving everyone unclear about the current state of the law. The IBBI operates on a principle: the best way to train goalkeepers is by constantly changing the rules of the game. And in this grand game of insolvency, Insolvency Professionals are the goalkeepers.

 

However, in every other publication, the IBBI first mentions the specific section of the Code that empowers it to issue such documents. Then the IBBI mentions why such a publication was necessary, often in an accompanied press release. Then there’s a breakdown of steps to be taken to give effect to the publication. However, when it comes to the CoC, the IBBI merely issues guidelines without referring to a single section or regulation in the legal framework. Why? Because the IBBI was never empowered to assign responsibility (blame) to any of the various stakeholders in the insolvency process – CoC, SCC, NCLT, SBoD, or the auditors. So all the “responsibility” falls on the Insolvency Professional who is the country’s new favourite scapegoat. This often leads to professionals being unfairly scrutinized while the real decision-makers remain insulated.

 

This is reminiscent of IBBI’s circular dt. 10.08.2018 which quotes various judgements from benches of the NCLT which mention that the members of the CoC attending the meetings of the CoC should be empowered to take decisions during the meetings. The NCLT had also directed the IBBI to form appropriate regulations on the matter. In this view, the IBBI had issued this circular directing the IRP / RP to include a note in the agenda for the meeting that the meeting must be attended by persons who are competent and authorized to take decisions on the spot without deferring to internal approval. Here again, the responsibility was thrown on the shoulders of the IRP / RP. Interestingly, this circular was rescinded by circular dt. 23.05.2022 which said that the 10.08.2018 circular was no longer necessary as it had been incorporated in regulation 17 of the CIRP Regulations. But regulation 17 made no such requirement for the CoC. And once again, the insolvency process was left at the mercy of the CoC.

 

To be fair to the IBBI, it is not their fault that they do not exercise any control over the CoC / SCC. The Code simply does not provide the IBBI any power to regulate the actions of the CoC, as it gives to regulate the actions of IPs. But the Code does give the power to the IBBI regarding the constitution of the CoC and SCC. IPs face a regular problem of non-contribution of funds from the CoC / SCC. However, the regulations do not provide the IPs any power to take any penal measures against the CoC / SCC. Instead, the IP is left as a beggar at the heels of the CoC / SCC in hopes of future fee payments and new assignments.

 

The past decade of insolvency has indoctrinated a culture where any lacuna in the insolvency process automatically becomes a fault of the IP. When the CoC does not approve a resolution plan for months in hopes of a higher resolution value through negotiations, it is the RP who has to take repeated extensions, exclusions, and enlargements from the NCLT. When the CoC does not furnish its confidentiality undertaking, the RP has to explain to the Board why the Information Memorandum was issued belatedly to the CoC. In doing so, we have built an expectation of the CoC to be cajoled by the IP at every stage of the insolvency process – right from the choice of the RP by the CoC.

 

The legislature, judiciary, and IBBI have consistently failed to assign real responsibility to the CoC and SCC. This has left IPs as the lone rangers in the vast landscape of insolvency. Being the only class of stakeholders that can be regulated by the IBBI, the IP becomes a natural scapegoat in the insolvency process. Perhaps it's time to empower the CoC with responsibilities—or at least some mild consequences—for their inaction. Otherwise, we may soon find that the only IPs left standing are those who couldn't secure employment elsewhere. And that might not be the vision of the profession that the IBBI is trying to create. Isn't it time we redefined the responsibilities of the CoC before we run out of capable Insolvency Professionals?

Tuesday, 26 March 2024

Audit Requirements under IBC

  • U/r 7(2)(ca) and 13(2)(ca) of the IP Regulations, both an IP and IPE are required to pay 1% of their annual turnover to the Board within 30 days of the end of each financial year

  • U/r 7(2)(cb) of the IP Regulations r/w 31A(2) of the CIRP Regulations, a fee of 1% of the cost incurred in a CIRP must be paid to the Board within 30 days of the end of each quarter

  • U/r 15(1)(b) and 15(5) of Liquidation Regulations, the progress report of a Corporate Debtor will contain audited accounts of the liquidator’s receipts and payments for the financial year. This report needs to be filed with the Adjudicating Authority within 15 days of the end of the fiscal year

  • Tabulating all costs and revenues of the IP, IPE, and the Corporate Debtors at the end of every year / quarter is often a huge task that requires at least an internal audit and ideally a statutory audit

  • Due to the incomplete audit, IPs and IPEs are compelled to submit fees to the Board based on provisional financials to comply with the Board's regulations

  • However, these provisional figures are subject to change, resulting in fees being paid to the Board based on inaccurate revenue and cost estimates

  • It is reasonable to expect that any fee levied by any statutory authority, including the Board, should be calculated based on audited financial statements. That is why most taxes and levies are also based on audited financial statements

  • Surprisingly, the Board only requires IPs to complete audits of themselves, IPEs, and Corporate Debtors within tight timelines of 15 or 30 days

  • This expectation is unrealistic and places undue burden on IPs, leaving room for potential misrepresentation to the Board and potential penalties in the future

  • Therefore, the Board may reconsider its timelines for fee levies until audits of IPs, IPEs, and Corporate Debtors can be appropriately completed